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privatisation	and	competition	over	public	ownership	and	social	security	(Steger,	2005;	
Steger	and	Roy,	2010).		
On	this	view	of	neoliberalism,	it	might	be	expected	that	the	interventionist	response	of	
core,	supposedly	‘neoliberal’	states	like	the	US	and	UK	to	the	crash	indicated	the	
beginning	of	the	end	of	neoliberalism	as	a	“globally	dominant”	ideology	
(Schwartzmantel,	2008).	However,	much	scholarship	on	neoliberalism	–	often	drawing	
upon	the	Marxian,	Gramscian	and	Foucauldian	traditions	of	critical	political	economy	–	
has	suggested	that	it	has	never	been	purely	a	project	of	free	market	fundamentalism	or	
a	renewal	of	laissez-faire.	Instead,	it	has	been	argued,	a	clearly	defined	role	for	the	state	
as	a	referee	between	citizen-consumers	and	businesses,	and	as	the	creator	and	
guarantor	of	competitive	market	conditions	in	new	social	spheres	is	essential	to	the	
neoliberal	creed	even	as	it	is	laid	out	in	the	work	of	Hayek	and	Friedman.	State	
interventions	are	not,	therefore,	unthinkable	in	neoliberal	societies,	at	least	where	such	
interventions	are	likely	to	protect	or	extend	capitalist	markets	and	their	constituent	
businesses.		
Neoliberalism	remains	a	growth	industry	in	critical	scholarship,	with	dozens	of	new	
books	and	journal	articles	being	published	each	year,	even	as	we	approach	the	10-year	
anniversary	of	the	crash.	In	this	article,	I	critically	evaluate	three	such	recent	
contributions,	published	by	the	editors	of	the	Soundings	journal,	by	Cornel	Ban,	and	by	
Andrew	Hoskins	and	John	Tulloch.	These	texts	straddle	the	disciplinary	boundaries	of	
politics,	international	relations,	media	and	cultural	studies,	but	have	in	common	that	
each	critically	explores	different	aspects	of	post-crash	neoliberalism	in	theory	and	
practice.		
The	Neoliberal	Crisis	(2015)	is	a	short	collection	of	essays	from	the	founding	editors	of	
Soundings,	centring	on	the	late	Stuart	Hall’s	‘The	neoliberal	revolution’,	originally	
published	in	Soundings	in	2011.	The	book	seeks	to	clarify	high	level	discussions	of	
neoliberalism	and	crisis	from	the	perspective	of	Gramscian	‘conjunctural	analysis’	and	is	
pitched	as	a	companion	piece	to	After	Neoliberalism?	The	Kilburn	Manifesto	(also	
2015),	the	Soundings	editors’	call	to	arms,	which	sought	to:	
[H]elp	people	on	the	left	think	more	about	how	we	can	shift	the	parameters	of	the	
[post-crash]	debate,	from	one	concerning	small	palliative	and	restorative	measures,	
to	one	which	opens	the	way	for	moving	towards	a	new	political	era	and	new	
understandings	of	what	constitutes	the	good	society	(Hall	et	al.	(eds.),	2015:	9).	
Cornel	Ban’s	Ruling	Ideas:	How	Global	Neoliberalism	Goes	Local	(2016),	meanwhile,	
takes	a	highly	structured	comparative	international	political	economy	approach,	
seeking	to	understand	the	varying	experiences	of	‘global	neoliberalism’	at	the	local	
level.	Drawing	upon	Karl	Polanyi’s	concepts	of	embeddedness	and	disembeddedness,	
Ban	compares	and	contrasts	the	Spanish	and	Romanian	experiences	of	neoliberal	
transformation.	In	doing	so,	his	book	highlights	some	of	the	crucial	differences	in	the	
way	neoliberalism	translates	from	theories	to	practices	and	from	the	global	abstract	to	
the	local	concrete	context.		
Finally,	Hoskins	and	Tulloch’s	Risk	and	Hyperconnectivity:	Media	and	Memories	of	
Neoliberalism	(2016)	approaches	the	analysis	of	post-crash	neoliberalism	in	theory	and	
practice	from	an	interdiscplinary	perspective,	representing	the	two	authors’	diverse	
backgrounds,	but	focused	on	media	representations	of	risk	in	the	present	neoliberal	era.	
In	this	article	I	approach	the	three	texts	thematically,	in	three	parts.	Firstly,	I	critically	
examine	the	theorisations	of	post-crash	neoliberalism	they	imply,	propose	or	extend.	
Next,	I	explore	their	varied	reflections	on	post-crash	neoliberalism	in	practice,	or	
‘actually	existing	neoliberalism’.	And	finally,	I	draw	out	and	examine	how	the	three	texts	
might	speak	to	the	current	crisis	of	the	Western	political	mainstream	–	Brexit,	the	rise	of	
Trump	and	the	far	right	–	and	what	clues	they	might	give	us	to	what	is	to	come	next.	
Post-crash	neoliberalism	in	theory	
As	Ruling	Ideas	notes,	far	from	sparking	a	decline	in	discussions	of	neoliberalism,	the	
post-crash	era	has	in	fact	stimulated	a	‘new	wave	of	literature’	(p.	8).	Much	of	this	
recent	literature	has	taken	as	its	conceptual	point	of	departure	the	fact	that	
commonplace	definitions	of	neoliberalism	as	equivalent	to	‘market	fundamentalism’	or	
–	as	the	Wikipedia	entry	has	it	at	time	of	writing	–	“the	20th	century	resurgence	of	19th	
century	ideas	associated	with	laissez-faire	economic	liberalism”	(Wikipedia,	2017)	–	are	
fundamentally	mistaken	(e.g.	Amable,	2010).	The	presumption	of	a	strong	anti-statist	
tendency,	of	a	drive	toward	pure	market	governance,	fails	to	account	for	the	specific	
role	of	the	state	outlined	in	the	work	of	neoliberal	scholars	like	Hayek	and	Friedman.	
Neoliberalism	in	both	theory	and	practice	has	required	the	state	as	the	engine	for	
extending	and	monitoring	markets	and	as	an	“umpire	to	interpret	and	enforce	the	rules”	
around	the	interactions	between	citizens-as-consumers	and	the	markets	(Friedman,	
2002,	p.	15).	To	talk	of	the	continued	influence	of	neoliberalism	in	a	post-crash,	post-
bailout	era	necessitates	a	clear	articulation	of	what	is	meant	by	neoliberalism	if	not	the	
resurgence	of	laissez-faire.	The	three	books	discussed	here	each	provides	a	unique	
theorisation.	
In	The	Neo-Liberal	Crisis	the	definition	of	neoliberalism	underpinning	the	book	is	
established	in	Chapter	1,	Hall’s	essay	on	the	‘neoliberal	revolution’.	Here	Hall	notes	that	
“the	term	‘neoliberal’	is	not	a	satisfactory	one”	since	its	“reference	to	the	shaping	
influence	of	capitalism	on	modern	life	sounds	recidivist	to	contemporary	ears”	(p.	13),	
but	argues	nevertheless	for	a	“provisional	conceptual	identity”	for	neoliberalism	
focused	on	the	notion	of	“the	‘free,	possessive	individual’,	with	the	state	cast	as	
tyrannical	and	oppressive”	(p.	14).	In	particular,	Hall	argues,	this	neoliberal	imaginary	
is	tied	to	a	visceral	opposition	to	the	post-war	welfare	state	or	‘settlement’,	and	to	the	
“do-gooding,	utopian	sentimentality”	which	neoliberals	believe	has	“enervated	the	
nation’s	moral	fibre,	and	eroded	personal	responsibility”	(p.	15).	
This	conceptualisation	of	neoliberalism	is	certainly	borne	out	by	even	a	cursory	reading	
of	neoliberal	‘classics’	like	Hayek’s	Road	to	Serfdom,	where	the	author	issues	dire	
warnings	against	the	“insidious	effect”	of	social	security	(Hayek,	1944,	p.	91).	
Meanwhile	Hall	offers	a	biting	riposte	to	those	who	have	suggested	that	neoliberalism	is	
too	conceptually	slippery	to	be	of	use	at	all	(e.g.	Barnett,	2005),	blaming	a	self-
proclaimed	and	very	“English”	pragmatism	which	“often	cannot	see	the	practical	
efficacy	of	long-term,	theoretical	ideas”	(p.	14).		
Neoliberalism,	says	Hall,	“has	many	variants”	and	is	“not	one	thing”	(p.	16).	It	“evolves”,	
beginning	from	some	classical	liberal	ideas	but	rearticulating	them	with	“a	further	
‘market’	inflexion”	(p.	20).	Ban’s	theorisation	of	neoliberalism	in	Ruling	Ideas	similarly	
notes	that	it	is	not	“a	seamless	and	steely	behemoth,	but	an	evolving	hybrid	whose	
every	concrete	manifestation	is	imbued	with	local	flavours”	(p.	3).	In	particular,	Ban	is	
keen	to	apply	Karl	Polanyi’s	concepts	of	embeddedness	and	disembeddedness	to	
neoliberalism	(pp.	12-13).	The	former	denotes	global	market	ideas	as	they	are	
integrated	with,	and	thus	partially	counter-balanced	by,	existing	local	ideas	about	
economic	policy,	the	latter	a	more	‘pure’	or	radical	imposition	of	global	neoliberalism	in	
a	local	context.	
However,	the	theorisation	Ban	goes	on	to	develop	in	Ruling	Ideas	is	rather	narrower	
than	Hall’s.	In	pursuit	of	a	“revisionist	definition”	that	is	neither	“very	broad”	nor	“very	
narrow”	(p.	8),	Ban	explicitly	eschews	both	the	increasingly	popular	Foucauldian	
approaches	to	conceptualising	neoliberalism	as	“applicable	[…]	to	the	totality	of	human	
existence”	(p.	7)	and	what	he	calls	“excessively	narrow	definitions	that	construe	
neoliberalism	as	a	contemporary	version	of	laissez-faire”	(p.	9).	However,	the	
“definitional	strategy”	he	ultimately	opts	for	seems	curiously	narrow	by	comparison	to	
either	of	these	approaches,	since,	for	example,	he	asserts	that	to	“understand	what	
neoliberalism	is,	one	has	to	understand	what	these	arcane	terms	[Ricardian	equivalence	
and	the	Laffer	curve]	mean”	(p.	11).		
Ban’s	definition	thus	situates	neoliberalism	as	a	largely	or	purely	‘economic’	theory	and	
practice,	requiring	the	specialist	terminology	of	economists	to	engage	with	it.	This	is	
problematic	inasmuch	as	one	of	the	key	achievements	of	neoliberalism	itself,	especially	
from	the	‘Third	Way’	era	onward	has	arguable	been	the	separation	of	politics	and	
economy	in	intellectual	labour	and	material	practice	–	something	Milton	Friedman	
argued	passionately	for	in	his	neoliberal	opus	Capitalism	and	Freedom	(2002).	The	
notion	that	to	‘understand’	economy	necessitates	serious	engagement	with	this	
specialist	pseudo-scientific	idiom	was	absolutely	central	to	propagating	the	neoliberal	
view	that	elected	governments	should	have	no	more	than	a	managerial	or	custodianship	
role	in	relation	to	economy	and,	by	extension,	that	there	‘is	no	alternative’	to	further	
marketization	and	privatisation.		
It	is	therefore	worth	noting	at	this	juncture	that	while	both	The	Neo-Liberal	Crisis	and	
Risk	and	Hyperconnectivity	offer	broader	and	more	“provisional”	conceptualisations	of	
neoliberalism,	to	use	Hall’s	term,	Ruling	Ideas	insists	on	a	more	specific	approach.	This	
approach	comes	at	the	risk	of	contributing	to	the	reification	of	a	key	neoliberal	division	
of	intellectual	labour.	Ban	writes	of	it:	
In	short,	the	book	uses	a	middle-range	definition	of	neoliberalism	that	overcomes	
the	too	broad	/	too	narrow	problem	of	existing	approaches	by	focusing	on	economic	
theories	and	schools	of	thought	as	the	core	of	the	ideational	side	of	neoliberalism	(p.	
17)	
Here	I	must	disagree	with	Ban’s	characterisation	of	his	own	definition.	This	definition	is	
very	narrow	indeed.	In	particular,	it	loses	sight	of	the	deeply	moral	content	of	
neoliberalism,	which	is	in	fact	foregrounded	in	the	classic	works	of	neoliberal	political-
economy.	“Economic	theories	and	schools	of	thought”	have	never	been	confined	to	
‘technical’	issues	like	monetary	policy,	privatisation,	macroeconomic	‘levers’	and	so	on.	
They	are	saturated,	just	as	much	as	political	theories	and	schools	of	thought,	in	ideas	
about	how	we	ought	to	live	together	as	societies,	ideas	about	the	‘good	life’,	and	
neoliberalism	is	no	exception.	Ban’s	situating	of	neoliberalism	as	only	existing	on	the	
‘economic’	plane	implies	that	the	critique	of	neoliberalism	is	simply	about	competing	
economic	rationalities,	when	in	fact	there	is	much	more	at	stake,	as	the	other	books	
discussed	in	this	article	ably	demonstrate.	
Hoskins	and	Tulloch’s	theorisation	of	neoliberalism	is	rather	less	clear.	The	authors	
avoid	an	explicit	definition	but	instead,	in	Chapter	Two,	“explore	some	key	concepts”	in	
“neoliberalization	theory”	(p.	23).	What	can	be	gathered	from	this	exploration	is	that	
they	firstly	sympathise	with	the	theories	and	histories	of	neoliberalism	of	Kim	England	
and	Kevin	Ward	(2007)	and	Daniel	Stedman	Jones	(2012).	In	particular,	they	suggest	
that	“our	own	project	will	be	similar”	to	those	which	favour	the	term	‘neoliberalization’	
over	‘neoliberalism’,	because	the	former	better	represents	the	continuously	unfolding	
nature	of	the	phenomena	it	describes,	whereas	the	latter	implies	an	“end-state”	(p.	32).	
In	this	respect,	Risk	and	Hyperconnectivity,	like	The	Neoliberal	Crisis	and	Ruling	Ideas	
shares	a	concern	with	the	contingent,	emergent	and	variegated	nature	of	neoliberalism	
in	practice.	
In	a	subsequent	passage	that	leans	heavily	–	or,	less	charitably,	too	heavily	–	on	two	
articles	by	Mitchell	Dean,	Hoskins	and	Tulloch	also	endorse	a	specific	Foucauldian	
reading	of	post-crash	neoliberalism	as	a	mode	of	governmentality	that	places	logics	of	
exceptionalism,	emergency,	precaution	and	risk	management	at	the	centre	of	its	
governmental	rationality	(pp.	33-40).	Dean’s	conceptualisation	of	neoliberalism,	they	
argue,	“adds	to	our	position	on	connectivity	thinking	about	powerful	“gravitational	
memories””	(p.	40).	Hoskins	and	Tulloch	are	interested	in	“neoliberal	modernity”	to	the	
extent	that	it	is	characterised	by	“hyperconnectivity”,	a	“multidimensional	mechanism	
of	late	modernity”	affording	“temporal	proximity	(and	distance)	to	the	past	and	to	an	
emergent	future	[…]	forging	and	reforging	new	assemblages	of	remembering	and	
forgetting”	(p.	11).	This	hyperconnectivity	is	lived	out	in	the	new	“media	ecologies”	(p.	
9)	of	the	internet	age,	which	in	turn	produces	“new	conflagration	of	risk	actors,	
discourses	and	events”	(ibid.).	Risk	and	Hyperconnectivity	is	thus	rather	more	
dependent	on	‘high’	social	theory	than	either	The	Neoliberal	Crisis	or	Ruling	Ideas	and	
as	a	result	tends	to	employ	a	less	accessible	and	more	specialist	vocabulary,	at	times	
with	limited	care	for	explanation.	This	author’s	translation	of	Hoskins	and	Tulloch’s	
model	is	that	they	consider	neoliberalism	–	a	globalising,	marketising	set	of	ideas	and	
practices	of	governance	–	to	be	reliant	upon	the	newly	and	highly	connected	global	
media	environment	enabled	by,	for	example,	smart	phones,	social	media	platforms	of	
Web	2.0,	and	other	internet	technologies.	In	particular,	they	see	the	social	reproduction	
of	neoliberalism	as	a	governmental	rationality	or	‘governmentality’,	in	Foucault’s	terms,	
as	dependent	upon	a	media	ecology	that	dominated	by	representations	of	risk,	
generating	a	catastrophic	social	imaginary	that	is	wracked	by	fear	about	the	future	and	
in	which	memory	is	a	vital	and	contested	political	terrain.	
In	these	three	books,	then,	we	find	distinct	and	divergent	theorisations	of	post-crash	
neoliberalism.	It	is	tempting	to	synthesise	them	thus:	in	the	post-crash	era	
‘neoliberalism’	signifies	the	continuously	unfolding,	and	regionally	and	nationally	
divergent,	process	by	which	the	post-war	‘settlement’	between	capital	and	labour	–	
especially	the	welfare	state	and	the	principles	of	social	security	–	is	being	overturned	in	
favour	of	a	more	completely	privatised,	individualised	and	competitive	capitalist	social	
model.	This	ongoing	transformation	currently	takes	the	form	of	a	mixture	of	theoretical	
adaptations	in	economic	policy	to	the	2007-present	crisis,	a	revival	of	nationalism,	and	
the	new	sense	of	risk	and	threat	that	is	enabled	by	recent	technological	revolutions.	
Post-crash	neoliberalism	in	practice	
In	the	same	way	that	the	‘really	existing’	or	‘actually	existing’	socialism	of	the	Stalinist,	
Maoist	and	other	communist	regimes	established	in	the	twentieth	century	diverged	
violently	from	the	vision	of	socialism	implied	and	described	in	the	works	of	Marx	and	
Engels	(Nove,	2013),	so	none	of	the	actual	instantiations	of	neoliberalism	in	the	world	
adhere	completely	to	the	theories	of	Hayek	or	Friedman.	This	has	led	to	the	coining	of	
“actually	existing	neoliberalism”	(Brenner	and	Theodore,	2002;	Chandler,	2014).	
In	addition	to	the	theorisations	of	post-crash	neoliberalism	in	the	three	books	under	
review,	each	also	offers	analysis	of	actually	existing	post-crash	neoliberalism.	The	
Neoliberal	Crisis	makes	two	fundamental	contributions	in	this	regard.	Firstly,	it	
decisively	embeds	the	political	history	of	the	New	Labour	and	Conservative-Liberal	
Democrat	coalition	governments	within	the	trajectory	of	neoliberalism,	thus	going	
beyond	the	standard	recognition	that	the	Thatcher	government	inaugurated	
neoliberalism	in	British	economic	and	social	policy-making.	Blairism,	too,	it	is	argued	
provided	a	new	“hybrid”	or	“variant”	of	neoliberalism	based	on	the	so-called	‘Third	
Way’,	which	aimed	at	and	achieved	“very	important	social	reforms”	including	the	
minimum	wage,	but	also	bought	fully	into	“the	new	managerial	doctrine	of	public	choice	
theory”	and	pressed	ahead	with	privatisations	and	marketisations	of	public	services	and	
public	property	(pp.	22-23).	Gordon	Brown,	as	Britain’s	first	post-crash	Prime	Minister,	
as	Hall	notes	“did	not	fundamentally	alter	New	Labour’s	neoliberal	inclinations”	and	
“admired	the	dynamism	of	American	free-enterprise	capitalism”	(p.	26).	The	
Conservative-Liberal	Democrat	coalition	that	followed	initiated	a	vast	programme	of	
‘austerity’	cuts	that	is	still	underway	today,	and	which	is	based	entirely	upon	neoliberal	
economic	theory	(as	Ban’s	Ruling	Ideas	demonstrates	at	length).	Like	Thatcher’s	
government,	Hall	argues	that	the	Coalition	“may	be	Conservatives	but	this	is	not	a	
‘conserving’	regime”	(p.	28).	The	privatisation	of	parts	of	the	NHS,	the	use	of	the	
‘localism’	discourse	as	a	means	of	effectively	de-funding	national	public	services,	and	a	
“phoney	populism”	based	on	concepts	of	‘community’	and	of	course	the	‘Big	Society’	
were	key	Coalition	strategies	for	adapting	post-crash	neoliberalism	(p.	29).	
Secondly,	The	Neoliberal	Crisis	raises	the	question	of	how	neoliberalism,	before	and	
during	the	crisis,	is	enmeshed	with	older	trends	in	nationalism.	This	theme	will,	
however,	be	picked	up	in	the	next	section	of	the	article.	
The	majority	of	Ruling	Ideas	(six	of	its	nine	chapters)	is	given	over	to	developing	a	
detailed	and	compelling	narrative	of	comparative	analysis,	explaining	how	“real-existing	
neoliberalism”	(p.	13)	became	established	in	Spain	and	Romania	in	the	pre-crash	era.	At	
the	heart	of	Ban’s	mixed	methods	research	approach	lies	a	systematic	and	persuasive	
re-construction	(through	analysis	of	policy	texts,	elite	interviews,	social	network	maps	
and	other	sources)	of	how	neoliberal	ideas	were	adopted	and	altered	in	his	two	case	
study	countries.		
Ban	first	shows	how	neoliberal	ideas	took	hold	in	post-Franco	Spain	through	a	process	
of	“editing”	(p.	21),	such	that	it	was	an	“embedded”	form	of	neoliberalism	that	was	
ultimately	realised.	He	documents	in	meticulous	detail	the	ideational	process	by	which	
key	policy	influencers,	especially	Luis	Angel	Rojo,	head	of	the	Bank	of	Spain’s	Research	
Service	and	Professor	of	Macroeconomics	at	Complutense	University	of	Madrid,	
introduced	and	“translated”	global	neoliberal	economic	ideas	into	Spanish	policymaking	
circles	(p.	43).	The	result	was	a	form	of	embedded	neoliberalism,	developed	by	
successive	governments	of	both	the	Socialist	and	Popular	(conservative)	parties,	which	
has	been	edited	together	with,	for	example:	
ideas	about	the	welfare	state	[…]	that	a	higher	minimum	wage	and	minimum	
pension,	more	spending	on	affordable	housing,	and	the	establishment	of	a	new	
social	program	for	dependent	persons	would	distribute	the	windfall	revenues	from	
the	boom	more	evenly,	while	also	representing	a	social	investment	in	the	country’s	
labor	force	(p.	62).		
Embedded	Spanish	neoliberalism	has	“deep	roots”,	Ban	argues,	since	the	key	
macroeconomic	figures	who	translated	it	were	engaged	in	global	policy	elites,	where	
neoliberal	ideas	predominated,	even	during	Franco’s	rule	(p.	114).	In	post-communist	
Romania,	on	the	other	hand,	Ban	tracks	the	emergence	of	a	form	of	“disembedded”	
neoliberalism.	Since	the	“poor	state	of	international	exchanges	of	economic	ideas	under	
Ceausescu”	insulated	Romanian	economist	from	neoliberal	influence	throughout	the	
Cold	War	period	(p.	117),	global	neoliberalism	actually	found	“few	sympathetic	
interlocutors”	in	post-communist	Romania	(p.	96).	So	neoliberal	ideas	did	not	fully	take	
hold	until	the	late	1990s,	following	sustained	external	pressure.	Ultimately	the	version	
of	neoliberalism	that	was	introduced	to	Romania	was	more	radical	than	in	Spain,	since	
it	did	not	need	to	be	edited	together	with	longstanding	redistributive	social	and	
economic	policies.	But,	like	in	Spain,	the	domestic	actors	who	helped	to	achieve	the	
eventual	dominance	of	neoliberal	economic	ideas	were	also	“clustered	around	the	
revolving	door	between	academia	and	the	central	bank”	(p.	80).	
The	final	two	chapters	of	Ban’s	book	deal	with	neoliberalism	in	the	post-crash	era,	or	
“neoliberalism’s	resilience	since	the	Great	Recession”	(p.	181).	In	post-crash	Spain	there	
was,	under	Zapatero’s	Socialist	government,	initially	a	limited	renewal	of	Keynesian	
macroeconomic	policy	–	achievable,	in	Ban’s	view,	because	of	the	embedded	nature	of	
Spanish	neoliberalism.	An	enormous	stimulus	package	in	2008	that	“balanced	
progressive	redistribution	with	supply-side	measures”	was	credited	with	initially	
creating	as	many	as	410,000	jobs,	delaying	the	now	notorious	unemployment	problem	
that	has	plagued	post-crash	Spain	(p.	183).	This	Keynesian	approach	was	enabled	by	
influential	Keynesian	economists	in	the	government’s	Economic	Bureau	and	in	the	
Socialist	Party’s	think	tank,	Fundacion	Ideas.	The	Spanish	government	even	benefited	
from	the	advice	of	global	anti-austerity,	Keynesian	economists	Joseph	Stiglitz	and	Paul	
Krugman	(p.	190).	By	2009,	however,	the	Bank	of	Spain	was	enforcing	deficit	control	
measures	and	the	path	to	austerity	was	set	(p.	192).	Increasingly,	since,	in	Ban’s	view	
the	“very	core	of	neoliberal	theory”	was	challenged	by	Keynesian	measures,	Spain’s	
“domestic	translators”	soon	found	hard	external	constraints	imposed,	especially	from	
the	European	Union	and	the	European	Central	Bank,	ensuring	a	return	to	the	neoliberal	
path,	whatever	the	human	cost	(p.	194).	So	while	embedded	neoliberalism	initially	
proved	“remarkably	resilient”	in	the	face	of	the	crash	(p.	208),	by	2010	“EU-level	
coercive	mechanisms”	were	threatening	an	increasingly	disembedded	model	(p.	209).	
Ban’s	bleak	conclusion	on	Spain	is	that	while	domestic	translations	of	neoliberalism	
matter,	they	will	face	powerful	threats	if	they	threaten	the	view	that	the	country	is	open	
for	business	to	investors	and	that	it	will	prioritise	the	claims	of	investors	over	the	social	
claims	of	citizens.	
The	more	radical,	disembedded	neoliberalism	in	Romania	led	to	a	drastically	different	
post-crash	response.	As	Ban	puts	it,	in	reference	to	comments	made	by	Romanian	
government	economic	advisers,	“It	is	not	every	day	that	one	hears	the	managing	
director	of	the	IMF	charged	with	being	an	ideologue	of	the	left”	(p.	210).	The	more	
radically	neoliberal	tendencies	in	Romanian	economic	policymaking	were	opposed	to	
the	IMF’s	suggestion	that	the	country	should	“spread	the	costs	of	austerity	more	
equitably”	(ibid.),	instead	favouring	sharp,	“regressive”	spending	cuts.	So	international	
coercion	does	not	explain	Romania’s	drastic	approach	to	austerity	cuts	and	
privatisations	in	the	post-crash	era.	The	‘troika’	of	the	EU	Commission,	European	
Central	Bank	and	IMF	in	fact	tried,	unsuccessfully	“to	curb	the	radicalism	of	local	
neoliberalism”	in	Romania	(p.	212).	This	radical	post-crash	neoliberalism	in	Romania	
did	not	go	unchallenged.	As	Ban	argues	throughout	the	book,	“the	untidy	mechanisms	of	
neoliberalism’s	ascendance	entail	temporary	accommodations	with	countervailing	
ideas”	(p.	236).	In	Romania,	he	notes,	a	crisis	of	disembedded	neoliberalism	took	hold	in	
the	winter	of	2011-2012	following	the	attempted	privatisation	of	various	health	
services,	which	triggered	enormous	anti-austerity	protests,	ultimately	bringing	down	
the	government.	From	2012	a	Social	Democratic	Party-led	government	did	not	institute	
the	progressive	taxation	system	it	mooted,	since	it	was	checked	by	the	neoliberal	
leanings	of	its	Liberal	Party	coalition	partners	(p.	239).	And	so	when,	by	mid-2015,	
Romania	could	claim	the	second	highest	economic	growth	rate	in	the	EU:		
Radical	neoliberals	attributed	this	robust	recovery	to	the	deepening	of	disembedded	
neoliberalism	during	the	early	phases	of	the	crisis,	via	the	confidence	effects	and	
increasing	competitiveness	of	the	economy	(p.	241).	
Ban’s	argument	that	neoliberalism	is	no	“steely	behemoth”	(p.	3)	is	certainly	supported	
by	his	detailed	analysis	of	the	political	back-and-forth,	economic	policy	processes	and	
exogenous	pressure	faced	by	Spanish	and	Romanian	variants	of	pre-	and	post-crash	
neoliberalism.	Even	in	‘disembedded’	and	‘resilient’	Romanian	post-crash	neoliberalism,	
we	don’t	find	any	finality	–	these	ideas	are	still	living,	changing,	and	still	contested.	It	is	
the	singular	achievement	of	Ban’s	book	that	is	shows	how	‘global’	neoliberalism	–	even	
narrowly	defined	as	a	macroeconomic	policy	orientation	–	plays	out	in	different	local	
contexts.	
In	Risk	and	Hyperconnectivity,	Hoskins	and	Tulloch	begin	their	analysis	of	post-crash	
neoliberalism	with	a	search	for	“alternatives	to	the	hegemonic	economic	and	political	
consensus”	in	the	British	media	in	2007	and	2008	(p.	52).	They	note	that	in	the	wake	of	
the	crash,	the	Guardian	was	alone	among	broadsheet	newspapers	in	using	the	term	
“neoliberal	economics”	to	refer	to	the	trends	that	had	brought	on	the	financial	crisis	(p.	
130).	Through	interviews	with	key	journalists	at	the	paper,	including	its	economics	
editor	Larry	Elliott,	and	analysis	of	articles	published	at	the	time,	they	explore	the	
memories	at	play	in	the	post-crash	debate.	In	particular,	the	authors	find	in	the	
Guardian’s	pages	at	this	time	the	invocation	of	“the	emergence	of	a	different	political	
and	economic	future	out	of	a	collectively	remembered	“neoliberal”	past”	(p.	56).	Calling	
for	a	“reinvention	of	Keynesian	economics”	(p.	60),	Guardian	journalists	sought	urgently	
to	influence	the	public	conversation	and	take	it	in	a	direction	other	than	‘business	as	
usual’.	The	Times	and	Telegraph,	unsurprisingly,	Hoskins	and	Tulloch	find,	take	a	rather	
different	approach,	seeking	to	advance	problem-solving	in	capitalist	macroeconomic	
theory.	The	interest	the	authors	take	in	this	debate	lies	in	its	function	as	“a	debate	
between	journalists	as	public	intellectuals	[…]	over	the	“goods”	and	“bads”	of	
contemporary	“risk	society””	in	the	post-crash	context	(p.	87).	It	is	of	course	vital	that	
we	understand	such	media	debates	if	we	are	to	understand	the	persistence	and	
dynamics	of	post-crash	neoliberalism,	and	in	this	sense	Risk	and	Hyperconnectivity	
makes	an	important	contribution.		
The	remainder	of	the	book	explores	media	representations	and	debates	around	the	G20	
demonstrations	in	2009	(the	first	major	post-crash	social	movement	in	the	UK	directed	
at	the	politics	and	economics	that	induced	the	crisis),	the	differing	ways	in	which	
tabloid	and	broadsheet	media	have	(re)produced	narratives	of	the	financial	crisis,	the	
extent	to	which	“emergent”	media	such	as	social	media	enable	a	wider	range	of	voices	
and	alternatives	to	be	heard,	and,	in	‘Part	II’	of	the	book	(which	amounts	to	less	than	a	
third	of	the	total	text)	analysis	of	some	short	“case	studies”.	The	authors	question	here,	
for	example,	whether	new	social	movements	associated	with	emergent	media,	such	as	
the	‘Hacked	Off’	campaign,	“actually	slows	of	stalls	what	Stuart	Hall	calls	“the	long	
march	of	the	Neoliberal	Revolution””	(p.	282).	In	the	final	chapter	of	Risk	and	
Hyperconnectivity	(the	book	does	not	have	a	‘conclusion’,	per	se),	the	authors	argue	
that	“the	protests	and	risk	events	explored	here	constitute	a	complex	battle-space	of	
neoliberalism,	risk,	memory	and	closure	and	openness	of	the	future	to	change”	(p.	297).		
While	Hoskins	and	Tulloch’s	account	of	actually	existing	neoliberalism	includes	some	
fascinating	research	and	analysis	in	terms	of	case	studies,	it	does	lack	coherence	as	an	
overall	text.	The	disjunctures	in	the	book	are	perhaps	explained	by	its	production	
process,	for	example,	one	chapter	concludes	thus:	“this	chapter	is	based	on	a	detailed	
narrative	and	discourse	analysis	[…]	conducted	by	John	Tulloch	[…]	during	2012	and	
2013”	(p.	87).	This	stitching	together	of	what	do	at	times	feel	like	rather	disparate	
analyses	and	themes	is	not	helped	by	somewhat	impenetrable	and	over-long	sentences	
used	to	describe	the	authors’	methodology,	which	are	spread	through	the	text.	The	
claim,	almost	a	third	of	the	way	into	the	book,	that	it	“incorporates	a	dialogical	and	
interdisciplinary	engagement	in	place	of	the	monological	inner	extension	of	a	particular	
analytical	paradigm”,	which	is	not	clearly	elaborated	on,	provides	a	case	in	point	(p.	88).	
Equally,	the	drastically	differing	lengths	of	chapters	and	sections	makes	for	a	rather	
uneven	read,	contributing	further	to	the	feeling	that	several	interesting	pieces	of	work	
have	been	stitched	together	here.	Sections	discussing	neoliberalism	are	often	devoid	of	
discussion	of	hyperconnectivity	and	risk,	and	vice	versa.	Such	are	the	risks	of	serious	
attempts	at	co-authored	interdisciplinary	social	science.	
What	the	three	books	discussed	here	share	is	the	provision	of	an	interpretive	
framework	or,	to	borrow	the	late	John	Berger’s	(1972)	term,	a	‘way	of	seeing’,	post-
crash	neoliberalism	as	it	plays	out	in	practice.	In	particular,	this	helps	readers	to	
appreciate	the	degree	to	which	neoliberalism	is	in	fact	contested,	adapted	and	
translated	in	its	path	to	globalisation.	But	they	also	its	remarkable	persistence	and	
resilience.		
As	Colin	Crouch	(2011)	has	argued,	rather	than	collapsing	altogether,	neoliberalism	
experienced	a	“strange	non-death”	after	the	crash.	Philip	Mirowski’s	insightful	analysis	
in	Never	Let	a	Serious	Crisis	Go	to	Waste	(2013)	further	suggests	that	what	he	calls	the	
“Neoliberal	Thought	Collective”	–	escaped	the	crisis	“unscathed”	because	“contrary	to	
every	expectation,	nothing	much	has	been	changed	by	the	crisis”	(p.	8).	Mirowski	is	
right	to	suggest	that	neoliberal	economic	ideas	somehow	survived,	or	were	even	
strengthened	by,	the	crash.	But	the	notion	that	“nothing	much”	was	changed	by	the	
crash	and	that	“the	sense	of	crisis	passed”	by	2011	(p.	1)	is	problematic.	At	the	
policymaking	level,	Mirowski	is	likely	right,	but	in	the	UK,	2011	was	just	the	beginning	
of	the	Conservative-Liberal	Democrat	coalition	government’s	programme	of	deep	public	
spending	cuts.	Today,	the	sense	of	crisis	is	doubtless	more	acute	among	those	directly	
affected	by	cuts	to	welfare	–	including	Council	Tax	benefit,	disability	allowances	and	
working	tax	credits	–	and	cuts	to	local	authority	budgets	and	local	public	services.	This	
programme	of	austerity,	like	its	counterparts	in	other	crisis-hit	countries,	mainly	targets	
people	already	in	positions	of	relative	disadvantage	and	vulnerability	(those	reliant	
upon	welfare	and	local	public	services).	The	books	under	review	here	do	offer	specific	
insights	into	the	uneven	effects	of	post-crash	neoliberalism,	and	it	is	to	this	question	we	
now	turn.	
Race,	nation,	and	the	future	of	post-crash	neoliberalism	
Guardian	journalist	Gary	Younge,	Hoskins	and	Tulloch	note,	was,	in	the	immediate	
aftermath	of	the	crash	“acutely	aware	of	the	linkages	between	neoliberal	economic	and	
foreign	policy,	migration,	and	issues	of	security	and	terror”	(p.	131).	Yet	in	all	the	
arguing	over	fiscal	stimuli	and	bail-outs,	cuts	to	public	services	and	other	economic	
issues	–	and	perhaps	especially	because	Tony	Blair	and	George	W.	Bush	were	leaving	
office,	while	Barack	Obama	had	signalled	(ultimately	false	or	unfulfilled)	intentions	to	
dismantle	the	‘War	on	Terror’	–	the	intersection	of	these	issues	was	widely	ignored.	It	is	
only	now,	a	decade	into	the	crisis,	that	we	can	see	with	clarity	the	degree	of	blurring	of	
issues	of	recession,	race	and	migration	that	has	taken	place.		
The	explanatory	narratives	that	predominated	in	the	media	in	the	wake	of	the	crisis	–	
for	the	left	wing	press	the	crisis	resulted	from	neoliberalism	or	at	least	‘free	market’	
economics,	for	the	right	wing	press	it	resulted	from	a	combination	of	a	few	bad	apples	
or	“Gordon	Gekko	types”	and	the	actions	of	governments	(Hoskins	and	Tulloch,	p.	80)	–	
have	seemingly	given	way	to	racialised	‘other’-blaming	for	the	effects	of	the	crisis.	In	the	
UK	immigrants	are	suspected	by	many	of	causing	the	crisis	of	public	services	that	is	in	
fact	clearly	and	indisputably	a	result	of	budget	cuts	flowing	from	the	2007	crash	and	
designed	by	the	2010-2015	Conservative-Liberal	Democrat	coalition	government.	Thus	
an	Ipsos	MORI	poll	of	1,257	British	adults	carried	out	the	week	before	the	EU	
membership	referendum	in	June	2016	found	that	“immigration	has	now	surpassed	the	
economy	becoming	the	most	important	issue	for	voters”,	with	33	per	cent	of	
respondents	mentioning	it	as	a	key	issue	for	the	referendum	(Ipsos	MORI,	2016).	A	
post-referendum	poll	by	Lord	Ashcroft	found	an	identical	proportion	(33	per	cent)	of	
‘leave’	voting	respondents	said	that	the	main	reason	for	their	vote	was	that	leaving	
“offered	the	best	chance	for	the	UK	to	regain	control	over	immigration	and	its	own	
borders”	(Lord	Ashcroft	Polls,	2016).	
Apart	from	the	view	that	‘immigrants’	are	somehow	to	blame	for	the	ill	effects	of	the	
financial	crisis	on	Western	societies,	a	specific	racialised	discourse	has	intersected	with	
this	narrative.	A	sense	that	Muslims	(of	whatever	national	heritage)	are	in	some	sense	a	
particularly	‘bad’	kind	of	immigrant	–	that	they	don’t	share	‘our	values’	or	‘British	
values’	(conveniently	ignoring	the	fact	that	millions	of	Muslims	have	been	born	and	
raised	in	the	UK	and	are	thus	a	part	of	‘us’)	–	has	been	established	through	panics	about	
the	threat	from	‘Islamist	terrorism’	and	its	alleged	overlaps	with	the	refugee	crisis	of	
2014-present.	This	blurring	together	of	post-9/11	Islamophobic	sentiment	with	post-
crash	anxieties	about	the	effects	of	recession	and	austerity	is	perhaps	even	more	acute	
in	the	US,	where	Donald	Trump	came	to	power	not	only	on	promises	to	curb	
immigration	generally,	but	the	promise	(now	realised	by	Executive	Order)	to	racially	
discriminate	against	Muslims	at	US	borders,	preventing	people	from	majority	Muslim	
countries	from	travelling	to	the	US	altogether. 
Several	passages	in	The	Neoliberal	Crisis	will	be	especially,	startlingly	prescient	to	
readers	after	the	events	of	2016	and	2017.	In	three	contributions	originally	published	
2010	and	2011,	years	before	Brexit	and	Trump	had	appeared	on	our	political	horizon,	
Hall,	Rustin	and	Clarke	each	offer	valuable	insights	into	how	neoliberalism	and	the	
crash	could	lead	to	the	predicament	we	find	ourselves	in	today.		
Hall	argues	that	from	its	first	entrance	into	the	British	political	mainstream	–	initially	
through	the	waging	of	the	Falklands	War	–	neoliberalism	was	carefully	blended	with	
nationalist	discourse:	“Even	today	the	market	/	free	enterprise	/	private	property	
discourse	persists	cheek	by	jowl	with	older	conservative	attachments	to	nation,	racial	
homogeneity,	Empire,	tradition”	(p.	22).	Rustin,	meanwhile,	reminds	us	that	the	
Thatcherite	‘New	Right’	that	brought	neoliberalism	into	government	in	the	last	great	
‘conjuncture’	(the	crisis	of	the	late	1970s)	relied	upon	“the	mobilisation	of	white	
anxieties	about	race”	(p.	35).	
Most	prescient	of	all,	however,	is	this	warning	from	Rustin,	originally	penned	in	2010:	
Although	the	recent	electoral	victory	of	Obama	and	the	Democrats	represents	a	
source	of	hope,	the	continuing	intransigence	of	the	Republican	opposition,	and	the	
possibility	that	a	failure	of	the	Democrats	in	government	might	bring	to	office	a	
president	with	a	political	outlook	like	that	of	Sarah	Palin,	is	a	cause	for	concern.	
A	cause	for	concern	indeed.	Donald	Trump	has	already	far	exceeded	many	of	what	were	
considered	Palin’s	most	worrying	traits,	further	demonising	Muslims	(and	immigrants	
in	general)	and	targeting	them	with	a	travel	ban	and	deliberate	harassment	(“extreme	
vetting”).	This	president,	endorsed	by	the	Ku	Klux	Klan	and	American	Nazi	Party,	a	
billionaire	enriched	by	the	era	of	neoliberal	globalisation,	and	empowered	by	Obama’s	
many	failures	in	office,	appears	to	fit	Rustin’s	bill	rather	comfortably.	
John	Clarke,	also	originally	writing	in	2010,	emphasises	that	it	is	an	error	to	perceive	
the	conjuncture	beginning	with	the	financial	implosion	as	a	simply	‘economic’	crisis.	In	
contrast	to	commonplace	financial	or	economic	reductionism	in	framings	of	the	crisis,	
Clarke	notes	that	one	of	its	dimensions	is	a	“return	of	the	national	as	a	political-cultural”	
and	that	in	the	context	of	the	crisis:	
[T]he	revitalisation	of	nationalism	[…]	is	a	distinctive	political-cultural	phenomenon		
in	which	postcolonial	legacies	meet	a	variety	of	other	elements	–	anti-Muslim	
orientalism,	anti-migrant	localism,	and	the	reinvention	of	nationality	as	a	claims	
making	identity	(p.	53).	
But	it	is	not	just	the	special,	and	little-explored	synergy	between	nationalism,	racism	
and	neoliberalism	that	is	at	stake	in	Brexit	and	Trump.	Clarke	also	describes	the	
depoliticisation	that	neoliberalism	has	encouraged,	the	increasing	scepticism	and	
cynicism	about	politics	among	ordinary	people.	He	laments	the	“characteristically	
populist	juxtaposition	of	the	people	against	the	political	class”	(p.	57)	and	issues	this	
dire	warning	in	conclusion:	
This	mixture	of	popular	desires	and	doubts	is	a	profoundly	unstable	one,	and	at	
present	appears	vulnerable	to	being	captured	by	varieties	of	nationalist	and	
racialised	imaginaries	of	exclusion	–	excluding	others	or	excluding	ourselves	from	
the	larger	world	(p.	58).		
In	the	book’s	concluding	chapter,	Doreen	Massey	notes	that	while	"we	face	a	continuing	
economic	crisis	in	the	UK	[...]	there	is	no	real	crisis	in	the	ideological	formation"	of	
neoliberalism	outlined	by	Stuart	Hall	in	the	book's	first	chapter	(p.	102).	On	the	book’s	
publication	in	2015,	such	an	argument	could	hold.	In	2017,	we	must	re-assess;	are	we	
now	living	through	precisely	the	ideological	crisis	Massey	refers	to?	It	should,	therefore,	
be	recognised	that	one	of	the	key	achievements	of	The	Neoliberal	Crisis	in	pulling	
together	several	years’	worth	of	the	Soundings	editors’	analyses	is	to	highlight	that,	had	
more	attention	been	paid	to	such	analysis,	neither	Brexit	nor	Trump	should	have	come	
as	a	surprise.	By	implication,	we	can	also	suggest	that	neither	was	inevitable.	Had	the	
central	call	of	both	The	Kilburn	Manifesto	and	The	Neoliberal	Crisis	–	a	call	to	avoid	a	
return	to	‘business	as	usual’	in	the	face	of	the	economic	crisis	–	been	heeded,	we	might	
not	find	ourselves	in	a	world	where	the	UK	is	leaving	the	EU	and	a	quasi-fascist	
billionaire	television	presenter	is	President	of	the	United	States.	
Conclusion	
The	three	texts	explored	here	make	important	contributions	to	our	understanding	of	
neoliberalism	in	at	least	three	ways,	each	of	which	has	been	addressed	in	this	article.	
First,	they	offer	theories	or	definitions	of	neoliberalism,	each	with	a	specific	intellectual	
heritage,	and	often	overlapping	but,	as	this	article	has	shown,	sometimes	standing	in	
opposition	to	one	another.	Second,	the	three	books	offer	analyses	of	how	and	why	
neoliberalism	works	in	practice	in	the	post-crash	era.	And	finally,	the	books	–	in	
particular	The	Neoliberal	Crisis	–	offer	some	explanation	for	the	emerging	political	
crisis	of	2016-17,	its	inter-relation	with	the	financial	crash	and	crisis	of	2007-present	
and	with	neoliberalism	in	general. 
These	contributions	are	important	not	only	because	they	further	our	understanding	of	
the	drastic	social	and	political	changes	initiated	by	the	crash	from	2007	onward,	but	
also	because	they	might	offer	a	key	to	understanding	more	recent	changes	and	the	
present	trajectory	of	Western	political-economic	and	social	trends.	These	books	were	all	
published	shortly	before	two	ostensibly	sea-change	events	–	the	UK’s	referendum	vote	
to	leave	the	European	Union	and	Donald	Trump’s	election	as	President	of	the	United	
States.		As	this	article	has	made	plain,	and	in	common	with	the	vast	majority	of	
literature	on	the	topic	of	neoliberalism,	all	three	books	adopt	a	‘critical’	stance	toward	
their	subject	matter.	Critical	economic	scholarship,	from	Ann	Pettifor	to	Joseph	Stiglitz,	
had	warned	us	that	the	financial	crash	was	coming,	but	was	not	taken	seriously	by	
political-economic	decision-makers.	After	the	crash,	as	this	article	has	shown,	critical	
scholarship	also	warned	us	in	advance	of	the	slide	into	white	nationalism	and	far	right	
‘populism’	that	mainstream	Western	politicians	of	more	or	less	all	stripes	lament	today.	
Again,	those	in	power	ignored	these	critical	voices	and	strived	for	‘business	as	usual’.	
Politicians	and	economists	would	do	well	to	begin	paying	urgent	attention	to	books	like	
these,	if	they	truly	hope	to	find	any	way	past	the	present	crisis	of	the	Western	political	
mainstream.	
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